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Matsushita v. Zenith: Sovereign
Compulsion and Conspiracy Go Out
Before the Trial Goes On
Michael K. Sweig*
I am also ... disappointed in the [Supreme] Court's declaration
that the acts of a sovereign state . . . are beyond the reach of
international law in the courts of this country. However clearly
established that law may be, a sovereign may violate it with im-
punity, except insofar as the political branches of the govern-
ment may provide a remedy . . . . [Niot only are the courts
powerless to question acts of state proscribed by international
law but they are likewise powerless to refuse to adjudicate the
claim founded upon a foreign law; they must render judgment
and thereby validate the lawless act . . . . No other civilized
country has found such a rigid rule necessary for the survival of
the executive branch of its government . . . and no other judici-
ary is apparently so incompetent to ascertain and apply interna-
tional law.**
I. Scenario
Suppose nearly one hundred foreign manufacturers participate
in a decade-long conspiracy to drive United States stereo manufac-
turers out of business. The conspiracy is effectuated by selling ste-
reos at artificially high prices abroad to finance and implement an
agreement to carve up the domestic market and sell the same stereos
at artificially low prices in the United States. Ultimately an Ameri-
can manufacturer sues the foreign manufacturers, alleging that vari-
ous aspects of the conspiracy violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
* Associate with Altheimer & Gray, Chicago, Illinois. B.A. 1980 University of Califor:
nia; J.D. 1986 DePaul University College of Law. Sweig, Do Lawyers Play While Victims Pay
When Corporations Discharge Toxic Tort Liability in Bankruptcy?, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 161
(1985), Sweig, Guidelines for Consumer Debt Collection Under the 1986 Amendment to the
FAIS Debt Collection Practices Act, COM. L. BULL. (Feb. 1987), reprinted in 21 NEw ENG.
L.R. I (Spring 1987).
** Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439-40 (1964) (White, J.,
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man Act,' Section 2a of the Robinson-Patman Act,2 Section 7 of the
Clayton Act,3 Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act,4 and the An-
tidumping Act of 1916.'
Defendants move for summary judgment and raise sovereign
compulsion as an absolute defense to antitrust liability. Defendants
argue that their foreign government compelled the plan. In support
of their motion, defendants submit a formal statement to the District
Court from the defendants own government. The court, however,
finds it unclear whether in fact the foreign sovereign has compelled
the plan because it is signed by lower level government employees.
The court denies defendants' summary judgment motion and rules
that the plan is a crucial piece of conspiracy evidence on the anti-
trust claims.
II. Introduction
American courts have long recognized that anticompetitive pri-
vate conduct that is compelled by a private sovereign and conclu-
sively proved by. an official pronouncement of a foreign nation does
not violate American antitrust laws.6 In Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
I. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal..."; 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). "Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign na-
tions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ...."
2. Section 2 of the Clayton Act was amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat.
1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a)(1970). "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce
• ..to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality ...."
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1982).
Every combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or contract is declared to be
contrary to public policy, illegal, and void . . . made by or between . . . persons
or corporations . . . engaged in importing any article from any foreign country
in to the United States (which) is intended to operate in restraint of lawful
trade, or free competition . . . or to increase the market price in any part of the
United States of any article or articles imported or intended to be imported in
the United States, or of any manufacture into which such imported article enters
or is intended to enter .
5. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982).
It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in importing any arti-
cles from any foreign country into the United States, commonly and systemati-
cally to import, sell or cause to be imported or sold such articles within the
United States at a price substantially less than the actual market value or whole-
sale price of such articles, at the time of exportation to the United States, in the
principal markets of the country of their production, or of other foreign countries
to which they are commonly exported ....
6. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 218-21 (1942); The Claveresk, 264 F.
276, 280 (2d Cir. 1920); Banca de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 114 F.2d
438, 438-44 (2d Cir. 1940); Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. American Can Co.,
258 F. 363, 368-69 (2d Cir. 1919); D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280,
1283-85 (D. Del. 1976), affd mem., 564 F.2d 89 (3d.Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035
(1978); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 110 (C.D. Cal.
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Bank of America,7 the primary recent case regarding extra-territo-
rial jurisdiction in foreign antitrust litigation, the court observed that
"corporate conduct .. .compelled by a foreign sovereign is pro-
tected from antitrust liability, as if it were an act of the state it-
self."8 This limiting doctrine is known as sovereign compulsion. The
defense theoretically applies when foreign law or executive authority
requires or directs the acts or contracts in question, when foreign
executive authority acquiesces in such acts or contracts, or when for-
eign law does not prohibit such acts or contracts. To date, courts
have applied the doctrine based primarily on notions of international
comity9 and "fairness" to antitrust defendants who must obey the
mandates of a foreign sovereign. Only one private foreign antitrust
defendant, however, has ever applied this defense successfully.'0
A similar limiting doctrine is sovereign immunity, which at
common law was an absolute defense to the jurisdiction of another
state." Common law courts analyzed whether a defendant was a for-
eign sovereign or its agent. Sovereign immunity is now codified by
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 2 which pre-
vents courts from adjudicating cases against foreign sovereigns or
their instrumentalities. FSIA also contains a limitation, codified as
the "commercial activities" exception. 3 The exception subjects a
1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972);
United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
7. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). Timberlane is the major case construing the "effects"
test, which the Ninth Circuit stated is "by itself ... incomplete because it fail[s] to consider
other nations' interest." Id. at 611-12. The court therefore proposed a three-prong test: (1)
whether the challenged conduct has an effect on American foreign commerce; (2) whether the
challenged conduct violates the Sherman Act; and (3) whether comity and fairness justify
extra-territorial application of United States antitrust law. Id. at 615. Of course, these three
factors must be weighed.
Since Timberlane, other Circuit Courts have developed their own version of the "effects"
test. See. e.g.. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-56 (7th Cir. 1980) (sub-
ject matter jurisdiction determined under Alcoa, but court should consider additional factors
not set out in Timberlane); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-
98 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirming Alcoa but stating that Timberlane factors should be balanced
"against our nation's legitimate interest in regulating anticompetitive activity"); but see Indus-
trial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884 (5th Cir. 1982) (opposing discretion-
ary jurisdiction and holding that courts should not apply antitrust law if it "would violate
principles of comity, conflicts of law, or international law"); National Bank of Canada v. In-
terbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981) (concerned that court using Timberlane might
exercise jurisdiction on effects too minor on United States commerce).
8. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 606.
9. Comity shifts the analysis of a lawsuit away from the competing arguments advanced
by the parties to the nations represented by the parties and their respective laws. To a great
extent, comity is a matter more of politics than law, and indeed, a judical device for refusing
to grant jurisdiction over a particular case (or at least a handy tool for exercising jurisdiction
but refraining from ruling on the merits). As such, the notion of international comity is well-
suited to aid the executive branch in the implementation of foreign affairs and policy.
10. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291
(1970).
II. See Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
13. Id. § 1605 (a)(2).
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foreign sovereign or its instrumentality to American jurisdiction
when the commercial activity has a direct effect in the United
States. Commercial activity is "determined by reference to the na-
ture of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose.""
This Article suggests that FSIA and its commercial activities
exception adequately answer questions that pre-FSIA courts had
used the sovereign compulsion doctrine to solve. Recent Supreme
Court case law indicates that application of the sovereign compulsion
defense in foreign antitrust litigation requires the precise analysis re-
quired and already provided for by the commercial activities excep-
tion to FSIA.
III. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
The above scenario closely parallels the facts in Matsushita
Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.'6 and has tremen-
dous implications for United States trade policy. In 1974, Zenith
Radio Corporation and National Union Electric Corporation (collec-
tively, plaintiff) sued numerous American and Japanese consumer
electronic product manufacturers (defendants). Plaintiff alleged an
illegal conspiracy to drive American producers out of the American
consumer electronic product market. 6
At summary judgment in the district court, defendants asserted,
inter alia, the sovereign compulsion defense, claiming immunity from
antitrust liability because the Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) allegedly had required them to enter
into the challenged pricing and market allocation agreements.17 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously vacated the grant of
summary judgment on the antitrust (and other) claims. The court
held that a statement signed by three low level MITI employees that
had been sent to the district court clerk in support of defendants'
foreign compulsion defense was a key piece of conspiracy evidence.' 8
14. Id. § 1603(d).
15. 494 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Elec-
tric Industrial Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (memorandum opinion and orders
granting summary judgment), affld in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983) (memo-
randum opinion and order vacating grant of summary judgment), rev'd, 54 U.S.L.W. 4319
(U.S. Mar. 25, 1986) (reversing and remanding order vacating grant of summary judgment).
16. The scheme included an alleged plan to fix and maintain artificially high prices for
defendants' products sold in Japan while concurrently fixing and maintaining low prices for the
same products in the American market.
17. The "check price" agreements were formal written agreements entered into by de-
fendants which established minimum prices for their products that were exported to the
United States. The "five-company rule" was a market allocation agreement by which defend-
ants agreed to sell directly to only five customers (dealers or distributors) in the United States,
including each manufacturer's own American sales subsidiary. Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 4, Zenith, 513 F. Supp. I100 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
18. The Third Circuit had observed that defendants need not have asserted the foreign
[Vol. 5: !
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The Third Circuit refused to give dispositive weight to this docu-
ment 9 and remanded the case for trial.
Defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari. The Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the Third Circuit applied proper standards in evaluating the district
court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, 0 and whether
defendants could be held liable under the antitrust laws for a con-
spiracy partially compelled by a foreign sovereign.
The Court vacated the Third Circuit's summary judgment rul-
ing and refused to address the sovereign compulsion issue, thereby
compulsion defense, since the challenged agreements and MITI Statement were proffered as
conspiracy evidence, rather than an independent basis for antitrust liability.
19. The letter to the Clerk of the United States District Court and text of the MITI
Statement are reprinted in Appendix, at 1-7. Brief for Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co.,
Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 723 F.2d 238 app. at 1-7 (3d Cir.
1983).
20. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Zenith primarily to review summary judg-
ment standards, particularly in antitrust cases. In its five-four decision, the Court held that the
Third Circuit applied existing summary judgment standards improperly and in derogation of
the principles advanced in the Court's earlier decisions. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Services Co.,
391 U.S. 253 (1968); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
699 (1962). It is curious that the Court's view of Monsanto appears in the Zenith opinion.
Monsanto was decided on appeal from a jury trial; Zenith was appealed from a grant of
summary judgment. Thus, as Justice White's dissent articulates, the majority only "muddies
the waters," 54 U.S.L.W. at 4325, and "makes confusing and inconsistent statements about
the appropriate standard for granting summary judgment." Id. at 4326. If summary judgment
ever was truly a pretrial proceeding, it remains so now only in form. After Zenith, summary
judgment is as much a trial as a trial itself. See, e.g., American Floral Services v. Florists
Transworld Delivery Serv. and Teleflora, 633 F. Supp 201 (N.D. Ill. 1986)(Shadur,
J.)(memorandum opinion and order denying motion to vacate grant of summary judgments in
favor of defendants); ("Now Matsushita [citations omitted] makes plain" that Poller v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1972) (advising sparing use of sum-
mary judgment in antitrust cases) is only a "caveat . . . and not an inexorable mandate").
In fact, Zenith kills traditional standards for inferring an "agreement" among competitors
sufficient to satisfy the "contract, combination, or conspiracy" requirement in Section I of the
Sherman Act. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) was the corner-
stone of the conscious parallelism doctrine, and in many cases (especially in foreign antitrust
suits) permitted a tenacious plaintiff the luxury of a trial on its conspiracy allegations in the
absence of direct evidence. Interstate Circuit stated as follows:
It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and in-
vited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it.
Each distributor was advised that the others were asked to participate; each
knew that cooperation was essential to successful operation of the plan . . . Ac-
ceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to partici-
pate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of
• . . commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sher-
man Act.
Id. at 226-27; accord United States v. Masonite, 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942).
Under the Zenith facts, plaintiff seemingly satisfied the Interstate Circuit requirements.
Each manufacturer accepted MITI's check price agreements and abided by the five-company
rule, despite their statutory right to withdraw from the cartel. All knew their competitors were
similarly cooperating, and no individual manufacturer could effectively charge higher prices in
the American market with any hopes of gaining significant market share while doing so. After
Zenith, however, a plaintiff must show as a matter of law, that a jury would find it more
probable than not that defendants intended and did conspire to injure the plaintiff. Zenith
teaches that a plaintiff must proffer evidence at summary judgment that excludes the inference
of independent action and makes such inference clearly implausible.
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substantially changing traditional requirements for inferring an
agreement among competitors in the absence of direct evidence.
Having found that plaintiffs could not have suffered a cognizable in-
jury in the American market from any action that raised prices in
Japan,'2 1 the Court held that if defendants were liable at all, they
would be "liable for conduct that is distinct from the check price
agreements. The sovereign compulsion question ... thus is not
presented." 22
The dissent, however, explained that plaintiffs were harmed, re-
gardless of whether defendants' engaged in predation in the United
States market. First, high Japanese prices retarded consumption in
Japan and forced excessive exporting of the same products to the
United States market, which subsequently depressed domestic
wholesale prices. 23 Second, the dissent recognized that defendants
exchanged proprietary information with the intention of avoiding
competition between themselves in the American market. The de-
fendants' "restrictions on intragroup competition caused [plaintiffs]
to lose business that they would not have lost had [defendants] com-
peted with one another." '24 Accordingly, with the conclusion that
plaintiffs could not have been injured, the majority's observation that
"the sovereign compulsion question . . . is not presented here" is
tenuous at best. The question was clearly presented - defendants
may not have asserted the defense in good faith, but the MITI
Statement obviously ranks as the type of official pronouncement that
foreign antitrust defendants traditionally have asserted to support
immunity from American antitrust law.
Proponents of the sovereign compulsion defense might argue
that the consequence of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion 2 5 (had it been affirmed with a decision or even dicta on the sov-
ereign compulsion issue) would itself dissuade foreign manufacturers
from engaging in fierce price competition in the United States out of
fear of incurring treble antitrust damages. Based on sovereign com-
pulsion, proponents would argue that American courts should give
21. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4325. The Court's statement is at first blush ambiguous. Plaintiff
accused the defendants of charging artificially high prices in Japan to finance predation (low
prices) in America. This passage in the opinion does not imply that defendants charged above
market prices in America, but that predation could have resulted only from the Japanese man-
ufacturers efforts in charging super-competitive prices in Japan. Thus, United States consum-
ers would have benefitted from the conduct of the Japanese due to the forced increase in low
priced exports to the United States, which the Court concluded torpedoed plaintiff's damage
argument.
22. Id. at 4325.
23. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4325-28. This observation is not ivory tower economic analysis.
Rather, the dissent analyzed ad nauseum the admissible reports of plaintiff's expert, Dr. Har-
old Podwin, to reach this conclusion. See id. at nn. 3 & 4.
24. Id. at 4326-27.
25. 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983); 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983).
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dispositive weight to a statement submitted to an American court,
especially when the statement indicates explicitly that the foreign
sovereign compelled the challenged conduct.
In light of Zenith and FSIA, it is questionable whether the sov-
ereign compulsion defense remains viable or necessary when foreign
commerce and American antitrust laws collide. Perhaps before the
enactment of FSIA, sovereign compulsion fairly met the needs of
courts loathe to insult or offend the executive branch or foreign sov-
ereigns. Today, however, with scholarly, journalistic, and business
commentary replete with tales of the American trade deficit and
domination of American markets by foreign producers, traditional
notions of international comity and "fairness" must be re-examined,
as must the traditional and normative distinctions between commer-
cial and purely governmental activity.
IV. May the United States as a State Deal with Acts or Agree-
ments Outside Its Borders?
A. Act of State Doctrine and the Banana Proposition
Early case law involving the act of state doctrine established the
ability of the United States to deal with acts or agreements outside
its borders. Classic act of state doctrine prevents American courts
from judging the governmental acts of a foreign country, especially
those that occur within that country's own territory. The seminal act
of state case is Underhill v. Hernandez,2' which held that "[e]very
sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another done within it's own
territory.' 27 In theory and application, the act of state doctrine pre-
serves the separation of powers. The doctrine separates the courts
and prevents them from interfering in foreign affairs conducted by
the executive branch.
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.2' was the first anti-
trust case that involved an extra-territorial question.2 9 Justice
Holmes stated that "the general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly
by the law of the country where the act is done."30 Justice Holmes
firmly established the Banana proposition: United States laws have
26. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
27. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
28. 213 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1909).
29. Though the act of state doctrine began with Underhill. American Banana was the
first antitrust case to apply the doctrine.
30. 213 U.S. at 356 (citing Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126
(1903)).
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no application in foreign territory absent an effect upon United
States foreign commerce. The plaintiff in American Banana charged
that the defendant, to prevent export competition from Costa Rica
and Panama, had secured long-term contracts with most of the fruit
producers in that region by outbidding competitors and compelling
producers to sell only on defendants' terms.
31
The Court found the challenged acts those of a foreign govern-
ment. Justice Holmes found the acts of the Panamanian government
and of the Costa Rican officials and soldiers to be those of the de-
fendant, since the defendants instigated those acts. American Ba-
nana indicated that liability under the Sherman Act was unsup-
ported solely on the influencing of officials or legislation in a foreign
country. However, even the Banana proposition implicitly recognizes
that parties who exceed this point and use acts of a foreign govern-
ment to effect an illegal conspiracy may not successfully avail them-
selves of the sovereign compulsion defense or any other form of anti-
trust immunity.
American Banana thus carved an exception to the prohibition
against monopolies in "trade or commerce . ..with foreign na-
tions."3 While the Sherman Act expresses no such exception, the
Supreme Court held that, on grounds of international comity, acts of
a foreign sovereign committed abroad or acts directed by a foreign
sovereign were not subject to the Sherman Act. As a corollary, the
Court held that to influence a foreign executive or successfully lobby
for legislative action is also beyond the Sherman Act.33 The Banana
proposition, however, does not suggest that a competitor's use of a
foreign sovereign's mandate to effect an illegal conspiracy is immune
from antitrust liability in the United States, and this caveat is firmly
rooted in subsequent cases.
31. Id. at 353-55.
32. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, supra note I.
33. Today the Noerr-Pennington doctrine probably would protect such activity. See
Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 187 (1961);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U:S. 657 (1965) (Sherman Act not applicable to
essentially political or economic conduct). It is questionable whether Noerr-Pennington applies
in foreign commerce, and whether American industry would violate the Sherman Act by lob-
bying a foreign government to enact restraints of trade. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Car-
bide & Carbon Corp., for example, the court held that respondent's role as the Canadian
government's purchasing agent was protected commercial activity under Noerr-Pennington.
However,.Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 108 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972) expressly questioned whether Noerr-Pennington would protect attempts to influence
foreign legislation. See also Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021
(1982) (lobbying exempt from antitrust laws) and Webb Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66




B. The Progeny of American Banana
The antitrust violations alleged in the progeny of American Ba-
nana resemble the alleged conspiracy in Zenith. In United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp.,3" the defendant obtained discriminatory legisla-
tion in Mexico, and thereby became the sole sisal purchaser in the
country. 35 Defendants argued their conduct was legal under Ameri-
can Banana. The Supreme Court, however, distinguished American
Banana, stating as follows:
[T]he fundamental object was control of both importation and
sale of sisal and complete monopoly of both internal and exter-
nal trade and commerce .... The United States complain of a
violation of their laws within their own territory by parties sub-
ject to their jurisdiction, not merely of something done by an-
other government at the instigation of private parties.36
The Banana proposition relied upon the general rule that acts
are adjudged as legal or illegal according to the law of the place
where they are done. Subsequent cases, however, indicate the con-
trary when plaintiffs prove adverse effects upon United States com-
merce. Assuming such effects, the sovereign compulsion defense can
be supported, if at all, only by acts that are required by foreign law,
but not when such acts are used with the intent of effecting illegal
anticompetitive results.
The Supreme Court considered the question of the effect of for-
eign law on the legality of actions abroad in 1962. Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Chemical Co.3 7 concerned acts in Canada of
the Canadian subsidiary of a United States company. The decision
expressly reaffirmed Sisal. In Continental Ore Co., the plaintiff
brought a private treble damage antitrust case under Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiff contended that the defendants had
excluded it from the Canadian vanadium market during World War
II. Plaintiff's charged that such exclusion occurred due to the actions
of the Canadian subsidiary of Union Carbide, Electro Met of Ca-
nada. The Canadian government had appointed Electro Met as the
exclusive wartime agent to purchase and allocate vanadium for Ca-
nadian industries.
Plaintiff proffered evidence at trial to prove that Electro Met of
Canada refused to purchase from plaintiff pursuant to the conspiracy
with the other defendants and thereby eliminated plaintiff from the
Canadian market. Thus, the market left open was divided between
34. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
35. Sisal is a hemp derivative used to produce rope.
36. 274 U.S. at 276.
37. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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Union Carbide and Vanadium Corp. of America. The district court
excluded this evidence.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
district court that, assuming the allegations were true, plaintiff was
not entitled to recover from defendants for the alleged destruction of
its Canadian business. The court noted that no vanadium could be
imported into Canada by anyone other than the Canadian govern-
ment's agent, Electro Met. Furthermore, Electro Met had refused to
do business with the plaintiff. The court reasoned as follows:
[E]ven if we assume that [Electro Met] acted for the purpose of
entrenching the monopoly position of the defendants in the
United States, it was acting as an arm of the Canadian Govern-
ment, and we do not see how such efforts as appellants
claim[ed] defendants took to persuade and influence the Cana-
dian Government through its agents are within the purview of
the Sherman Act.38
Similar to the Third Circuit's decision in Zenith (which relied
on Continental Ore Co.), the Supreme Court unanimously reversed,
holding that the plaintiff's proof was relevant evidence of a violation
of the Sherman Act and should have been presented to the jury. The
Court carefully noted that the plaintiff did not question the validity
of any action by the Canadian government or its Metals Controller.
Furthermore, the Court found no indication that the Canadian Con-
troller or any other Canadian approved government official "ap-
proved or would have approved of joint efforts to monopolize the pro-
duction and sale of vanadium or directed that purchases from
Continental be stopped."3
Thus, in Continental Ore, Justice White found Sisal to be a
strong analogy. He stated that no question was raised as to any ac-
tion of the Canadian government and concluded that "[a]s in Sisal,
the conspiracy was laid in the United States, was effectuated both
here and abroad, and respondents are not insulated by the fact that
their conspiracy involved some acts by the agent of a foreign
government.
40
United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information
Center, Inc."' further distinguished acts that a foreign government
encouraged from acts that a foreign government required. Watch-
makers involved cartel arrangements by the Swiss watch industry.
38. 289 F.2d 86, 94 (9th Cir. 1961).
39. 370 U.S. at 702, 706 n. II.
40. Id. at 706. This analysis seems to apply precisely to the conspiracy alleged in Zenith.
However, in its analysis of summary judgment standards in Zenith, the Supreme Court ruled
the other way, even though the alleged conspiracy in Zenith also occurred partly in the United
States.
41. 1963 Trade Cas.(CCH) 70,600, at 77, 414-457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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The court found that beginning in 1931, four American watchmak-
ers had conspired with five Swiss defendants to eliminate competi-
tion in the United States import and export business and in the pro-
duction and sale in the United States of watches, watch parts, and
watchmaking machinery. The Swiss defendants included a Swiss
manufacturers' trade association, Federation Suisse des Assocations
de Fabricants d'Horlogerie (FH) and a Swiss holding corporation
that owned the stock of Swiss companies that made watch parts
(Ebauches). A primary means of effectuating the conspiracy was an
arrangement entered into in Switzerland termed the "Collective
Convention." ' This arrangement was designed to prevent the devel-
opment and growth of competitive watch industries outside Switzer-
land, particularly inside America. The Collective 'Convention re-
quired its participants not to export watch parts from Switzerland
except under certain restrictions and conditions, not to furnish
watchmaking machinery or technical assistance outside Switzerland
except with restrictions, not to deal in or allow affiliates to trade
watches manufactured by nonmembers, and not to export from Swit-
zerland various types of uncased movements.
Defendants had agreed to limit the export of watches and watch
parts to the United States. They further agreed not to sell watch
parts for manufacturing purposes and to blacklist United States sell-
ers of Swiss watches not conforming with their sales to FH and
Ebauches. The American defendants actively participated in the
conspiracy through individual contracts that restricted the volume of
watches produced in the United States and limited the United States
export of domestically produced watches and the re-export of Swiss
watches. The court further found that "[t]he United States watch
industry was the Swiss watch industry's biggest competitor, and the
restrictions of the Convention have obviously had a crippling effect
in this country, and were so intended.
'43
Defendants in Watchmakers argued that the agreements were
executed and took effect in Switzerland, in accord with Swiss law
(and therefore beyond the reach of United States law). Defendants
further contended that their actions were actually those of the Swiss
government. The court rejected both arguments and reasoned that
foreign law must be mandatory to constitute a justification. Aside
from any requirements of foreign law, "a United States court may
exercise its jurisdiction as to acts and contracts abroad, if, as in the
42. Id. at 77,425. Like Continental Ore Co., the Watchmakers conspiracy parallels the
cartel in Zenith and JMEA's apparent intent to restrain competition in America.
43. Id. at 77,457. Like the Swiss watch industry, the Japanese consumer electronic pro-
ducers' largest competitors were the Americans. For a review of authority interpreting subse-
quent case law regarding the intended effects of anticompetitive conduct, see infra note 70 and
accompanying text.
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case at bar, such acts and contracts have a substantial and material
effect upon our foreign and domestic commerce.""
The court observed as follows:
It is clear that these private agreements were then recognized as
facts of economic and industrial life by that nation's govern-
ment. Nonetheless, the fact that the Swiss Government may, as
a practical matter, approve of the effects of the private activity
cannot convert ... a vulnerable private conspiracy into an unas-
sailable system resulting from governmental mandate.4
5
The district court in Watchmakers concluded that only "direct
foreign government action compelling the defendants' activities"
could prevent a United States court from exercising its jurisdiction. 4
Mere approval of some of defendants' activities by a foreign govern-
ment would not shield them from liability. Watchmakers relied upon
the "mandatory" rule, but did not find a requirement of foreign law
in the case. The court stated that the agreements were formulated
privately without any compulsion from the Swiss government.
However, the court ultimately indicated that it would defer to
some extent to the sovereignty of the Swiss government. The final
judgment in the case (though not intended to permit a repeat of the
events that had engendered the original litigation) stated that noth-
ing therein would "limit or circumscribe the sovereign right and
power" of the Swiss government or its ability to contract for or effect
regulation of its own watch industry.'7
The foregoing case law engendered the theoretical development
of the sovereign compulsion doctrine. Sovereign compulsion, as the
doctrine developed at common law, fairly met the needs of courts
reluctant to intrude on the province of the executive branch. Con-
gress, however, effectively ended this quandry a decade ago with the
enactment of FSIA.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 77,456-57. This warning foreshadows Zenith's complaint that the Japanese
used the MITI Statement and its provisions as an "industrial bludgeon." See infra note 63 and
accompanying text.
46. Id. at 77,457. This passage illustrates the connection between the act of state doc-
trine and sovereign compulsion. For general discussion of act of state and sovereign compul-
sion, see R. FALK, THE AFTERMATH OF SABBATINO (1965); B. HAWK, UNITED STATES. COM-
MON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST (1979); Dunfee & Friedman, The Extra-
Territorial Application of the United States Antitrust Laws: A Proposal for an Interim Solu-
tion, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (1984); Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sovereignty, 49
VA. L. REV. 925 (1963); Waller, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S. Antitrust
Law: The Japanese Auto Restraints and Beyond, 14 LAW & POL'Y. INT'L Bus. 747 (1982);
Comment, Foreign Government Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7
VA. J. INT'L L. 685 (1976).
47. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Center, Inc., judgment modi-
fied, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352, 80,490, at 80,491 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)
In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA)"' with four intended objectives: (1) to codify the "re-
strictive principle of sovereign immunity"; (2) to insure that the re-
strictive principal of immunity is applied in litigation before United
States courts; (3) to provide a statutory procedure for making service
upon and obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a foreign state; and
(4) to help plaintiffs enforce and collect judgments against foreign
sovereigns.4 9 FSIA provides that foreign states are not immune from
suits based on commercial acts, and further provides that the "na-
ture" of the underlying act is determinative while its "purpose" is
irrelevant. 50
FSIA states, in relevant part, as follows:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case:
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with the commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with the commercial ac-
tivity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes
a direct effect in the United States."'
FSIA Section 1603(d) defines commercial activity as "either a regu-
lar course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial trans-
action or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be deter-
mined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose."
'52
The pertinent part of Section 1606 provides as follows:
As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is
not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this
chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances; but a foreign state except for an agency or instrumen-
tality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages; .... '
48. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-11(1982)).
49. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6605-06, [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)(1982).
51. Id. § 1605(a)(1982).
52. Id. § 1603(d)(1982).
53. Id. § 1606(1982).
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The foregoing FSIA provisions provide an adequate basis for
courts and litigants to resolve the problems that the sovereign com-
pulsion doctrine theoretically was intended to solve.
D. Sovereign Compulsion Doctrine
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America 4 highlighted the
necessity of an effect on United States commerce. Thus, the sover-
eign compulsion defense has been described as a corollary to the act
of state doctrine,5 5 which "precludes the courts of this country from
inquiring into the validity of the public acts of a recognized foreign
sovereign power committed within its own territory." 56 Sovereign
compulsion differs, however, from the state action doctrine, which
applies to domestic antitrust disputes. The state action doctrine re-
flects the view that, although the Sherman Act is the law, Congress
did not intend by silence in the Sherman Act to prohibit action of a
state that may restrain competition.5 7 However, sovereign compul-
sion resembles the state action doctrine to the extent that American
antitrust laws do not apply to private conduct compelled by state
governments.58
Thus, unlike Watchmakers, Interamerican Refining Corpora-
tion v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.59 found, in 1970, that an alleged
boycott actually resulted from genuine foreign sovereign compulsion.
Interamerican is the only reported case ever to uphold assertion of
this defense. Plaintiff, Interamerican (a U.S. company), planned to
process low cost Venezuelan crude oil in a bonded refinery in New
Jersey that it had leased from another company, and to export prod-
ucts or to sell them as ship's bunker in New York Harbor, thereby
avoiding United States oil import quotas and tariff restrictions. After
several shipments, the Venezuelan government instructed two de-
fendant oil companies (subsidiaries of Monsanto and Texaco) that
held oil concessions in Venezuela to curtail Venezuelan oil shipments
to Interamerican. Prior sales had been made through an intermedi-
ate trading company, the Amoco Trading Corporation. All the in-
volved companies were American. After the government's action, the
54. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); see supra notes 7 - 14 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697
(1976); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03
(1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); International Ass'n of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 649
F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
56. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 401.
57. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
58. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 3564 (1984); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350 (1977).
59. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
[Vol. 5:1
MATSUSHITA V. ZENITH
two suppliers refused to sell to Amoco for resale to Interamerican.
Other Venezuelan oil suppliers also refused to trade with Amoco.
The court held that sovereign compulsion was an absolute defense to
Interamerican's boycott allegations.
Though it is arguable that the conduct in Interamerican was
beyond the mandates of the Venezuelan government, it is noteworthy
that the government completely controlled exported oil. Thus, the
court stated that "[a]nticompetitive practices compelled by foreign
nations are not restraints of commerce, as commerce is understood in
the Sherman Act, because refusal to comply would put an end to
commerce."
60
Successful application of the sovereign compulsion defense in
Interamerican signified judicial acceptance that anticompetitive con-
duct compelled by a foreign sovereign engenders foreign policy con-
cerns that are the traditional province of the executive branch. One
of the fundamental characteristics of national sovereignty is the con-
duct of foreign relations, including foreign economic and trade rela-
tions. 61 Any foreign government, like the United States government,
may exercise its sovereignty according to its own law and policy, es-
pecially when this exercise involves only the control of a sovereign's
nationals' activities within its own territory and regarding its own
export trade.
The larger problem, however, is that sovereign compulsion cre-
ates a legal license for foreign competitors to ignore American anti-
trust laws, and may be used as a veil, or as in Zenith, a "false issue"
and "industrial bludgeon "62 in subsequent litigation. It is exceed-
ingly difficult to prove that a foreign sovereign did not intend to
cause an adverse effect on American commerce by promulgating re-
straints of trade that would otherwise subject it or its nationals to
American antitrust liability.
Practically speaking, foreign competitors may do under the ae-
gis of their governments what the Sherman Act makes illegal to do
on their own. One of the evils that inheres in the sovereign compul-
sion defense is that it penalizes antitrust plaintiffs for the defendant's
antitrust violations. To date, neither a plaintiff's innocence nor the
actual damages suffered as a consequence of a defendant's illegal
conduct has ever been the paramount consideration in foreign anti-
60. Id. at 1298 (citing BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
(1925)).
61. This raises a separation of powers argument that is beyond the scope of this Article,
but well-characterized by Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936), in which he stated that the President is the "sole organ" of the
United States in international relations. See also Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No.
774, ch. 932, § 708, 64 Stat. 798, 818-19 (1950) (permitting President to grant business anti-
trust immunity).
62. Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24.
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trust cases. In application, sovereign compulsion creates an unfair
windfall for antitrust defendants at the expense of plaintiffs.
Zenith apprised the Supreme Court of this exact problem:
Significant portions of [defendants'] conduct were not dealt with
in the [MITI] note ... MITI did not direct [defendants] to fix
prices in Japan, to dump, to commit customs fraud by filing
false U.S. Customs invoices, to lie about their prices to the U.S.
Treasury Department . . . , to lie to MITI about their true
prices, to collude with one another to continue to conceal their
prices and to continue their dumping campaign, or to transform
aspects of their export arrangements into an industrial bludgeon
to be jointly wielded in the United States. The note itself de-
scribes an unwritten "direction" of uncertain content and scope
by persons unknown on a date or dates unknown to persons un-
known at places unknown with legal effect, if any, unspecified.
Moreover, the course of conduct involved did not occur wholly
within the territorial boundaries of Japan ... [Defendants'] un-
conditional ability to withdraw from the formal cartel arrange-
ments, a right protected by Japanese statute, the absence of any
sanction for non-compliance, the absence of any formal decree,
the absence of any statement of any Japanese legal officer as to
the legal effect, if any, of the "direction," the existence of an
unexercised legal right to review of any "direction" which if ex-
ercised would have resulted in invalidation of any "direction" -
a fact at least showing [a] lack of reliance on the alleged "direc-
tion" - the fact that MITI's so-called "administrative guid-
ance" is not even a defense to charges under the Japanese an-
timonopoly laws, and defendants' total failure to conform their
conduct to the "direction," all combine to deprive the [MITI]
note of any remaining significance whatever.
3
Defendants' unconditional ability to withdraw from the formal
cartel is particularly noteworthy. The "withdrawal" provision of the
first agreement provided the absolute ability to withdraw upon thirty
days' notice. In fact, Japanese law permitted exporters to withdraw
from export arrangements when such withdrawal was not otherwise
restricted." As Zenith's counsel told the Supreme Court, "It is un-
disputed that no Japanese manufacturer or exporter was required to
belong to the [cartel] ."65 That defendants dispute this in their briefs
63. Id. at 24-26.
64. Id. at 25 n.17 (citing Export and Import Trading Act, Pub. L. No. 299, 5 August
1952, § 5-bis(v)).
65. Id. at 24 n.17. Despite the express Japanese withdrawal statute, the United States
argued as amicus curiae in Zenith that the repeated use of the words "determined," "di-
rected," "supervision, mandated," and "enter into" clearly supported defendant's sovereign
compulsion defense. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-19. See also Brief
of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari ("directing" and "effecting" export control agreements); Petition For A Writ of Certiorari
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itself highlights the problematic nature of the doctrine and the
defenses.
Third Circuit dicta also highlights the problems with the sover-
eign compulsion defense:
[I]t cannot be said with any degree of certainty that the mini-
mum prices .. .were in fact determined by the Japanese Gov-
ernment. It is possible to conclude that the government merely
provided an umbrella under which the defendants gained an ex-
emption from Japanese antitrust law, and fixed their own export
prices. Second, there is abundant evidence suggesting that many
defendants departed from the agreed upon minimums and took
steps to conceal their departure from MITI. Third, there is no
record evidence suggesting that the five-company rule originated
with the Japanese Government. Finally, the evidence about price
stabilization in the Japanese home market suggests unequivo-
cally that this activity violated the laws of Japan."
Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that "a summary judgment...
on the defense of sovereign compulsion would be improper."67 The
court further stated that any significance of the MITI note must be
analyzed in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances, namely,
the nature of the challenged conduct and the alleged government
mandate."
Executive concerns for not offending foreign sovereigns are out-
dated in the current world economy. Specialization and the division
of world labor markets require congressional recognition that today's
world economy is as much an integrated unit as the American econ-
omy when Congress enacted the Sherman Act. The analysis in a
case in which a foreign antitrust defendant raises sovereign compul-
sion as an absolute defense should focus on whether a state-pre-
scribed program is really a surrogate for competition or instead col-
lusive private conduct hidden behind state regulation. And this
analysis can be done under the currently existing FSIA provisions.
In contrast, the sovereign compulsion doctrine currently exempts for-
eign competitors or American businesses in foreign nations who can
pressure their governments into mandating arrangements that are
primed to attack American competitors and violate American anti-
trust laws.
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 20 (reference to the Japanese
Government's "official pronouncement attesting to the mandatory nature and governmental
character" of the MITI statement).
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V. When Is Challenged Conduct Private or Governmental?
The statutory requirement provisions in Zenith present an ideal
model for distinguishing private and governmental action when de-
fendants raise the question of antitrust immunity. Defendants in
Zenith quite plainly had a choice: they could have withdrawn from
the cartel at any time. The existence of choice, alternative, and a
direct effect within the United States 9 should forever bury sovereign
compulsion after Zenith and FSIA.
Initially, a plaintiff must ask under FSIA whether the chal-
lenged conduct has had a direct effect within the United States.7
0 If
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)(1982).
70. Though the "trade or commerce ... with foreign nations" clause in the Sherman
Act reached the Supreme Court in American Banana, in which it was interpreted as not cover-
ing conduct beyond American borders, extra-territorial application of the antitrust laws did
not emerge until post-World War II economic activity and clearly established the United
States as the dominant power in international trade. United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) set out the first test. Judge Hand wrote in
Alcoa that the Sherman Act applied to foreign conduct when challenged activities are "in-
tended to affect imports or exports, [and] .. .[are] shown actually to have had some effect on
them." Id. at 444. This is the "intended effects" test, which requires a plaintiff to show that
the impact of foreign conduct on United States commerce is direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable.
Judge Hand's notion is well documented in the law reviews and in case law, though some
cases have begged the intent and foreseeability questions while still upholding antitrust chal-
lenges to foreign conduct. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. Ltd., 395 F.
Supp. 221, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (intent to cause material and adverse effect on interstate
or foreign commerce presume the natural consequence of actions); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co.
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586, 587, modifying 375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
("The territorial restraint imposed by Anheuser-Busch in violation of the Sherman Act di-
rectly affected the flow of foreign commerce out of this country"). Other courts have simply
held that effects need only be direct and substantial. See, e.g., Dominicus Americana Bohio v.
Gulf W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. But-
tes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972) (quoting J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
AND TRADE REGULATION SECTION 5.01, at 5.502 (1969)). Timberlane Lumber Co., however,
held merely that "it is probably unnecessary for that effect to be both substantial and direct,
so long as it is not de minimis." 549 F.2d at 610-11. Now, however, the Reagan Administra-
tion proposed to make the test more rigorous and less favorable to private antitrust plaintiffs.
See "Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1986," reprinted in, News Highlights:
Antitrust, Administration Unveils Reform Package Aimed At Revised Import Relief, 3:9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 268. The bill proposes to add a new § 21(a)(4). The amendment would
require courts to assess "the relative significance and foreseeability of the effect of the conduct
on the United States as compared with the effects abroad." This is more than a semantic
change from the language of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15
U.S.C. § 6(a)(1982), which looks to the "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable" ef-
fects of challenged conduct. There is only one reported decision that relies on this statute. See
Eurim-Pharm GmgH v. Pfizer, Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1102, 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding no
jurisdiction for lack of any alleged facts "demonstrating a causal connection between defend-
ant's conduct in Europe and the price increase in the United States"). In effect, it would be a
Congressionally mandated return to Lochnerism to force the judiciary to assess the "relative
significance" of challenged conduct. The Administration's bill fails to specify how a party
would prove such an amorphous concept.
For earlier treatment of the subject, see generally, W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND
THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.10, at 67 (3d ed. 1982); Blechman, Antitrust Jurisdiction, Discov-
ery and Enforcement in the International Sphere: An Appraisal of American Developments
and Foreign Reactions, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1197, 1198-99 (1980); Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdic-
tion Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. IND. & COMM. L.
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there has been no direct effect, a plaintiff will have a basic
Timberlane and Banana problem. As previously stated, the Banana
proposition relied upon the general rule that acts are adjudged as
legal or illegal according to the law of the place where they are done.
This is not true, however, when adverse effects upon United States
commerce are proven.
Regardless of compulsory language contained in an official pro-
nouncement of a foreign government, the question would still revert
back to the foreign sovereign's own law: does a statutory right to
withdraw or avoid the "requirements" of foreign governmental trade
regulations preempt the regulations ultimate enforceability? Under
this analysis, if the answer is affirmative, a foreign antitrust defend-
ant would be barred from asserting an immunity defense for failure
to avail itself of its own statutory alternative to avoiding antitrust
liability for private commercial activity. If the answer is negative, a
defendant need only assert FSIA as its defense, that is, it should lay
blame at the hands of its own government. In circumstances in
which a defendant is caught without a statutory alternative, the
analysis is simpler; FSIA is an absolute defense absent commercial
activity.
To the extent this analysis resembles the sovereign compulsion
defense, FSIA absorbs whatever independent judicial application
may have remained of the defense after the enactment of FSIA. The
concept is the same; the law, however, is now codified. The Supreme
Court's silence on sovereign compulsion in Zenith is unfortunate;
dicta or a footnote would have been a welcome first spade in the dirt
for a doctrine that Congress effectively buried a decade ago. Essen-
tially, sovereign compulsion is the American equivalent of official
foreign import restraints or restrictions, either of which would be de-
fensible under FSIA. In short, FSIA serves the purposes of both
plaintiffs and defendants in foreign antitrust litigation. FSIA is an
absolute defense, or the commercial activities exception will preserve
a plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against an "agent or instru-
mentality" of the foreign sovereign who is engaged in commercial
activity. Thus, the definition of commercial activity is of paramount
importance.
Many courts have drawn the distinction between public and
commercial acts of a foreign sovereign to apply sovereign immunity,
sovereign compulsion, and the act of state doctrines. 71 All are helpful
REV. 199, 206 (1977).
71. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. The Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
697 (1976) (distinguishing between public and commercial acts of a foreign government on act
of state grounds and "policy of foreclosing court adjudications involving the legality of acts of
foreign states on their own soil that might embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government
.. ."); United States v. Deuthsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y.
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as definitions, but none seem to establish a normative standard.
Though articulated long ago, Chief Justice Marshall articulated
what remains a rather clear test in Bank of the United States v.
Planters' Bank of Georgia.72 Chief Justice Marshall stated as fol-
lows: "[W]hen a government becomes a partner in any trading com-
pany, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that com-
pany, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private
citizen.1
7 3
In fact, Congress and the courts seem to have been somewhat
true to Chief Justice Marshall's observation, and appear to have
been narrowing the scope of the sovereign compulsion defense all
along. According to FSIA's legislative history, even a contract to buy
military provisions would be a commercial act.74 In Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Pezetel,7 5 a Delaware district court granted the
plaintiff a trial on its antitrust claims against Pezetel, a Polish golf
cart exporter, despite the fact that Pezetel was an instrumentality of
the Polish government - a state controlled economy. The court held
that under FSIA, a nation is subject to the antitrust laws when en-
gaged in commercial activity. Assuming arguendo that Pezetel was
the government in this case, the court evidently characterized its acts
by reference to the commercial transaction itself, rather than by ref-
erence to its purpose.7 Outboard Marine essentially employed the
analysis that the dissent and Third Circuit decision in Zenith de-
mand. As the Third Circuit noted, the MITI Statement should have
been analyzed in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances,
namely, with reference to the transactions sanctioned by MITI, not
with reference to their purpose. The Third Circuit in Zenith was
doing no more than applying the restrictive theory of immunity, the
same theory that FSIA was enacted to accommodate.
VI. Conclusion
In defense of the sovereign compulsion doctrine, critics of the
application of American antitrust law to foreign commerce lament
the political irony when private foreign companies comply with the
1929) (on sovereign immunity theory the court stated that "[a] foreign sovereign cannot au-
thorize his agents to violate the law in a foreign jurisdiction, or to perform any sovereign or
governmental functions without the domain of another sovereign, without his consent. He ...
cannot claim as a matter of comity or otherwise that the act of the alleged agent in such case
is the act of the sovereign, and that a suit against the agent is in fact a suit against the
sovereign"); Interamerican v. Texaco Maracaibo, 307 F.Supp. 1291 (D.Del. 1970) (only case
to uphold defendant's acts on grounds of genuine sovereign compulsion).
72. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
73. Id. at 907.
74. HousE REPORT, supra note 49, at 16.
75. 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
76. Id. at 395.
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trade policies of their own and perhaps the United States govern-
ment. However, sovereign compulsion will not help foreign firms in-
volved in voluntary compliance with official pronouncements of their
own government. In light of FSIA, there is truly no chance that legal
challenges to foreign companies will unfairly subject them to United
States antitrust liability. FSIA is an American pronouncement of
Congressional intent to apply antitrust law to foreign commerce.
Sovereign compulsion is a pre-FSIA judicial device and response
that courts had applied predominantly to avoid intrusion on the do-
main of executive branch in international relations. FSIA expressly
eliminated that possibility; now Congress should expressly eliminate
the sovereign compulsion doctrine.

